Affect in Deleuze and Spinoza

Deleuze's concept of affect draws heavily from Spinoza's monistic ontology, which perceives existence as a single substance manifesting through countless parallel attributes. This perspective implies that no individual entity possesses an essence that distinguishes it ontologically from others.

Spinoza’s non-dualistic foundation leads to a relational understanding of affect. A body is never viewed in isolation but always in terms of its ability to influence and be influenced by others. Deleuze adopts Spinoza’s characterization of bodies as defined by “relations of motion and rest” and varying “intensities.”?

Rather than fixed identities, we encounter differing ratios of speed (longitude) and capacities to affect or be affected (latitude) that define a body at any moment. Affect refers to transitions between states — the continuous modulation of a body’s intensive capacities through interactions.

In this framework, psychological experiences occur along a continuum that includes the brain, body, and environment. Any component in the milieu can register affectively, thereby influencing the emergence of subjectivity.? The focus is on relationships and processes rather than pre-existing entities.

Psychological existence is a fluid outcome of a body’s engagement within an affective milieu, not merely the product of internal representations.

The affective dimension closely relates to the capacity of relationships to enhance or inhibit a body’s ability to act. Spinoza highlights the fundamental affects of joy (expansion) and sadness (contraction).? However, Deleuze warns against oversimplifying these into a binary good/bad framework, advocating instead for a nuanced spectrum of affective transitions.

Crucially, in a Spinozist-Deleuzian context, affect and emotion are not merely internal states but refer to the transitions between different relational configurations of both human and non-human bodies and ideas. Psychological life emerges as the dynamic outcome of a body’s presence in an affective environment, rather than being solely the result of internal representations.

This ecological, process-based view of affect represents a significant departure from traditional psychological frameworks. It urges us to reconsider how subjective experiences arise in a world increasingly perceived as interconnected between cognition and emotion across human and technological networks.¹? This line of thought directly connects to the contributions of Gilbert Simondon.

Simondon and Individuation

Simondon, a pivotal influence on Deleuze, was a philosopher of technology who emphasized the interconnectedness of humans and machines. As keen observers have pointed out, his assertion that “human reality lives through technologies”¹¹ gains particular relevance in our digitally dominated context.

Simondon’s principal philosophical innovation was to reconceptualize individuality as a continuous process of individuation. For him, the individual subject is not a static essence but a metastable equilibrium within a broader “preindividual” field.¹²

This concept implies that a subject is perpetually open to further individuation — to transformative experiences and affects that reshape its boundaries. “The individual is not a being but an act,”¹³ signifying an emergent expression of a differential milieu rather than a fixed entity.

Simondon emphasizes the active role of technical objects in influencing psychological existence.

He describes the “associated milieu” as the essential condition for individuation.¹? This milieu acts as an intensive field that does not dictate but modulates the trajectories of the elements navigating through it.¹?

Contrary to theories that attribute agency solely to human cognition, Simondon argues for the active role of technical objects in shaping psychological experiences. There exists a continuous flow of “energy and information” between the subject and the milieu¹? — a relational exchange that contributes to the individuation of both.

Importantly, Simondon’s relational view applies equally to human subjectivity and machines. Psychic and collective individuation form an inseparable pair, emerging together from a preindividual field.¹? Thus, the subject is individuated both internally and through its interactions with social and technical environments.

This perspective challenges any straightforward separation between individual and environment. The living being “grows from both the inside and the outside,”¹? integrating elements from the external world into its very essence. The outcome is a complex network of relations that cannot be easily compartmentalized into subject and object.

Affectivity and Emotion

How, then, do we comprehend the specificity of human emotion within Simondon’s framework? The answer lies in his differentiation between affectivity and emotivity, which represent two facets of the psychic-collective individuation process.

Affectivity pertains to the fundamental relational nature of the individual — its involvement in an associated milieu that surrounds it.¹? To experience affectively is to perceive the intensity of the preindividual field, acknowledging one’s incomplete identity as an individual.

Emotivity, conversely, emerges when a subject reflexively understands its context and attempts to reconcile affective tensions through a temporary, coherent self-concept.²? Anxiety serves as a prime example of an emotive response to the disorientation stemming from our inherent immersion in an affective milieu.

Thus, emotion is not purely an internal phenomenon; it arises at the intersection of the individual and its associated environment. Affectivity acts as the 'link' connecting a being’s self-relationship and its connection to the world²¹ — a world increasingly populated with powerful digital technologies.

Toward an Affective Digital Psychology

What insights does this ontogenetic viewpoint provide for addressing the challenges of digital existence? How might we utilize Simondon’s concepts to outline an affective psychology suited to our technological present?

At a fundamental level, Simondon prompts us to consider affective environments instead of isolated emotions tied to individual subjects. The introduction of new technology alters the entire associated milieu and consequently shifts the intensive parameters of experience.

Take, for example, the well-known instance of chess grandmaster Garry Kasparov’s defeat by the computer program Deep Blue.²² The common interpretation suggested that the machine outsmarted the human by processing data more efficiently.

However, from a Simondonian perspective, the essential transformation lay in the affective dynamics of the game. The “affective circuitry” of human versus human play was disrupted by the new human-computer interaction, changing the conditions for the emergence of thought and feeling.

Our deepest emotions reflect traces of a socio-technical externality.

This case highlights the necessity for a psychology that can recognize the reciprocal interaction between emotion and digital technologies. Simondon’s ideas present a robust framework for moving beyond a simplistic dichotomy between genuine human emotions and the rigid algorithms of digital systems.

Simondon posits a dual-sided (psychic and collective) process of individuation. Our innermost feelings are influenced by a socio-technical environment, and even the most abstract digital frameworks are shaped by affective investments. Psychological experiences do not belong to an isolated sphere; they exist at an intensive frontier where individuals and their environments continuously intersect.

From this perspective, the increasing digitization of life does not signify a rupture from some original state of affective purity. Instead, it offers an opportunity to investigate the emerging affective environments as human and technological agencies become more intricately connected.

Simondon’s viewpoint also questions concerns about digital media “manipulating” our emotions from an external standpoint. While digital platforms are adept at influencing affective flows,²³ there is no fixed, pre-technological self that can be corrupted by exposure to digital effects. Affect is inherently transindividual, generated through connections between the psychic and the collective.

In summary, ontogenetic psychology would approach emotion in our digital age as less about defending boundaries and more about navigating environments. The goal would be to foster an ethic of sensitivity to the affective qualities of our digital landscapes, allowing us to better engage in the dynamics of psychic and collective individuation.

This task is undoubtedly complex. Yet, at the very least, Simondon encourages us to ask alternative questions — shifting our focus from the presumed interiority of the subject to the charged spaces where “inside” and “outside” are perpetually redefined. In a time when digital technologies are increasingly woven into our thoughts and emotions, this onto-ethical reorientation is one worth pursuing.

Conclusion

This article has introduced an ontogenetic psychology grounded in the conceptual heritage of affect and individuation from Spinoza and Deleuze to Simondon. The essential move has been to reconceptualize psychological experience as a relational process emerging at the intersection of the individual and its associated (technical and collective) environments.

Affect acts as the 'link' between the internal and external, the intensive charge through which a living being perceives and understands its place within a context that surpasses it. Emotion, in contrast, is a reflexive mechanism for managing this charged relationality, crystallizing a temporary subjective coherence from the affective flow.

By framing affect and emotion as transindividual processes that traverse the psychic and collective, both the interior and exterior, an ontogenetic perspective challenges us to rethink the nature of psychological existence in an increasingly digitized landscape. As human and technological forces become increasingly entangled, Simondon calls for our attention to the new affective environments that are forming — and the ethical and political opportunities they may present.

The ontogenetic route is undoubtedly challenging. It requires us to relinquish our conventional image of a self-contained subject in opposition to a world of objects. However, it provides a rich array of conceptual resources for navigating the intricate currents of affect and technology that characterize contemporary life. In a period when rapid changes often seem to outpace our comprehension, this orientation may be invaluable.