The Principle of Strict Scrutiny

The Fourteenth Amendment mandates that governmental actions must not unfairly discriminate against individuals. While not all distinctions made by the government are unconstitutional, those based on race, ethnicity, or religion require a heightened level of justification due to their potential for harm.

In Loving v. Virginia (1967), the Supreme Court evaluated Virginia's laws against interracial marriage, ruling that any legislation discriminating based on race must undergo strict scrutiny. This means such laws must demonstrate a compelling government interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest without infringing on individual rights.

Strict scrutiny extends to laws that discriminate based on religion and national origin, driven by historical injustices such as the Jim Crow laws and the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. These laws, often justified as serving the public interest, perpetuated systemic discrimination.

This rigorous standard compels the government to substantiate its reasons for any law that categorizes individuals in ways that could affect their fundamental rights.

Understanding Intermediate Scrutiny

Intermediate scrutiny is a judicial review standard applied to laws that classify individuals based on gender. It provides a less stringent test than strict scrutiny but still demands careful evaluation due to the possibility of unjust discrimination.

The development of intermediate scrutiny is highlighted by cases like Frontiero v. Richardson (1973) and Craig v. Boren (1976). Initially, Frontiero suggested strict scrutiny for sex discrimination, but Craig established that a law must serve an important government objective and be substantially related to achieving that goal.

In Craig v. Boren, the Supreme Court examined an Oklahoma law that set different legal ages for young men and women purchasing “low-point” beer. The Court ruled that the law did not meet the requirements of intermediate scrutiny, as it failed to demonstrate a substantial relationship to its stated goal of reducing drunk driving.

The Rational Basis Review

Rational basis review is the most permissive form of judicial scrutiny, applied to government actions that do not involve fundamental rights or suspect classifications like race or sex. Under this review, a governmental action must only be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.

The case United States v. Carolene Products Company (1938) is foundational in this context, emphasizing the presumption of constitutionality afforded to government actions unless there are clear violations of rights.

In Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. (1955), the Court upheld a law regulating the fitting of eyeglass lenses, concluding it was rationally related to public interest, despite not directly improving health or safety.

Nevertheless, rational basis review includes safeguards against arbitrary discrimination. If a law appears motivated by hostility toward a specific group without a legitimate aim, it will not pass constitutional scrutiny, as seen in Romer v. Evans (1996).

Identifying Suspect Classifications and Intent

A significant aspect of equal protection law involves determining what constitutes discrimination based on "suspect classifications" such as race, gender, or religion. Discrimination can be explicit, but the Supreme Court has also addressed laws that may seem neutral yet have discriminatory effects.

According to Washington v. Davis (1976), the mere existence of a disparate impact on a group does not automatically subject a law to heightened scrutiny; intent is crucial. The law must be shown to have been crafted with the intention to discriminate based on a suspect classification.

This intent requirement complicates the proof of unconstitutional discrimination, particularly when the law impacts a certain group disproportionately. For example, in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney (1979), the Court ruled that a law favoring veterans in state employment was not sex discrimination, as its primary intent was not to discriminate based on gender.

The challenge of proving intent is even more pronounced in criminal law enforcement. To argue discriminatory enforcement based on race, one must show that similar individuals were prosecuted differently solely due to their race, as highlighted in United States v. Armstrong (1996).

When evaluating laws for constitutional fairness, courts examine the underlying purpose. This includes affirmative action policies aimed at increasing diversity in public universities, which must withstand scrutiny to ensure they do not unjustly discriminate against others.

Cases like Fisher v. University of Texas (2013) and Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) explore whether affirmative action can effectively promote diversity while maintaining fairness. The essential question remains: Can we achieve diversity without unfairly disadvantaging others?

The core of this examination is to balance the admirable goal of diversity with the constitutional requirement of equal treatment, ensuring laws like affirmative action are crafted carefully to meet both objectives without crossing into discrimination.

Extending Equal Protection Beyond State Actions

Equal protection principles apply not only to state actions but also to the federal government, as established by the U.S. Supreme Court.

In Bolling v. Sharpe (1954), the Court determined that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment includes an equal protection component, preventing the federal government from engaging in discriminatory practices that states cannot enact under the Fourteenth Amendment. This ruling was significant, occurring on the same day as Brown v. Board of Education.

However, there is a nuanced distinction in how discrimination by the federal government is reviewed, especially regarding alienage. In Mathews v. Diaz (1976), the Supreme Court ruled that federal discrimination based on alienage is generally subject to rational basis review, reflecting the federal government’s authority over immigration.

Conversely, state discrimination based on alienage typically faces strict scrutiny, which requires laws to serve a compelling state interest. This standard was articulated in Graham v. Richardson (1971), where the Court acknowledged that certain governmental functions may justify distinctions based on citizenship, albeit within narrow boundaries.

Disclaimer

The information in this article is intended for educational purposes and should not be considered legal advice. Legal principles can vary widely by jurisdiction and specific circumstances. Readers are encouraged to consult with a qualified attorney for legal matters, as individual cases may require tailored analysis.

Relying solely on the information herein without professional counsel may lead to unintended consequences. The author or publisher assumes no responsibility for any errors or losses arising from the use of this material. No attorney-client relationship is created by reading this article.